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University of Amsterdam, THE NETHERLANDSOne Company, Four Factories:
Coordinating Employment Flexibility
Practices with Local Trade UnionsABSTRACT ■ This article reports a case study of employment flexibility
patterns in four factories of a multinational company in western and central
Europe. There is remarkable variation in these patterns, which structural and
institutional factors alone do not explain. Rather, the interests
of management and local unions, and the character of their mutual
interaction, are central for workplace employment practices. In factories with
cooperative industrial relations, unions are extensively involved
in employment flexibility even if management lacks a legal obligation
or economic incentives to do so. In consequence, the company policy
is neither a straightforward adaptation to host country institutions, nor
a simple diffusion of corporate ‘best practice’.
KEYWORDS: embeddedness ■ employment flexibility ■ multinationals ■ social
interaction ■ workplace trade unionstion
e discusses, and seeks to explain, variations in employment
of production workers in four factories of a Dutch multina-
pany (MNC) in the electronics sector. The company is
 here by a pseudonym, Electra. The article is based on empir-
ch conducted in Belgium, France, Hungary and Poland in
lthough high flexibility is a priority in all factories, a remark-
ion exists in the organization of working time, headcount
s and the workforce structure. These flexibility practices
diffused from the company’s headquarters, but developed
 coordination with local trade unions, shaped by differing
ur market conditions in western and central Europe. How,
xplain this diversity, and what is the role of coordination
e MNC and local trade unions therein?DOI: 10.1177/0959680107073968
The answer proposed is based on the assessment of structural, institu-
tional, behavioural and social factors originating on the one hand in the
MNC, and on the other hand in particular local settings. On the side of
the MNC, interests can range from best practice diffusion, hybridization
based on local specificities and corporate benchmarking, utilization of
local conditions with the aim to deploy innovative flexibility practices, to
adaptation to local employment practices in each host country. As regards
local influences, the role of trade unions is central. First, union involve-
ment in employment issues is legally regulated in all the countries studied,
but yields different rights in each. Second, management interest in bene-
fiting from local conditions may be translated in different kinds of social
interaction with unions in different countries and factories. Whereas in
one case the interaction with unions may be limited to legally stipulated
negotiations, in others management may foster union involvement in
developing employment practices that exceeds legal requirements. Finally,
the unions’ own capacity to engage in social interaction with the MNC
and therefore in the process of developing employment flexibility matters
influences the final outcome.
Based on these considerations, I study the particular way in which the
MNC utilized local conditions and developed employment flexibility
practices though interaction with trade unions in each factory. This inter-
action is socially embedded if the interacting parties share common
values that motivate their coordination, even without a legal obligation to
negotiate with unions, and there are no obvious economic benefits from
involving the unions. Embeddedness may be a feature of MNC interac-
tion with a variety of local actors, including other employers, but as
employment issues are central to the trade union agenda, and union
involvement is legally stipulated in each host country, the analysis focus-
es exclusively on management–union coordination.
The next section discusses the analytical framework and research meth-
ods, followed by presentation of the empirical evidence. Next I evaluate
the structural and institutional factors that influenced managements, then
I analyse social interaction with workplace trade unions and its explana-
tory relevance for varying flexibility practices. The concluding section
summarizes the arguments.
Analytical Framework: Coordinating Employment
Practices with Local Trade Unions
Most analysis of workplace employment practices in MNCs focuses on the
transfer of practices between headquarters and subsidiaries located in dif-
ferent host countries. Arguments range from convergence in management
styles under the influence of the home country and corporate isomorphism
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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(Dickmann, 2003; Ferner, 1997; Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998; Geppert et
al., 2003; Harzing and Sorge, 2003; Tüselmann et al., 2003) to adaptation of
practices to host-country conditions, reflecting ‘societal effects’ and
involvement in local networks (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Maurice and
Sorge, 2000; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). In between stands the notion
of hybridization (Boyer et al., 1998; Meardi and Tóth, 2006) incorporating
both company interests and external pressures to integrate home-country
and host-country practices. The MNC can foster adaptation to local con-
ditions, resulting in similar employment practices to those in other local
companies; or can take advantage of local conditions to develop innovative
or hybridized employment practices.
However, the literature says little on the interest and the legal obligation
of MNCs to coordinate employment flexibility endeavours with local
employee representatives. Meardi and Tóth (2006) and Kristensen and
Zeitlin (2005) discuss the attraction of local conditions for the MNC and
the resulting involvement in local networks; however, the firm’s attempt to
benefit from varying local conditions is presented as an internal decision
and process, and it does not account for ongoing social interaction with
external actors, such as local unions. In this article I do not ask whether
particular employment flexibility practices have been diffused, adapted, or
hybridized. Instead, I show that they are an outcome of interaction
between the MNC and trade unions in each factory. This enables the com-
pany to benefit from the variety of labour markets and industrial relations
systems in different countries.
I view employment practices as an outcome of behavioural coordina-
tion between actors within a given institutional framework (Scharpf,
1997). In other words, flexibility measures result from direct interaction
between local factory managements and local trade unions (see Figure 1).
The level of analysis is the local, referring to particular geographical and
institutional settings in which each factory is located. The local is part of
a national host-country institutional space, including labour markets,
norms and employment practices, industrial relations systems, and the
legal regulation. These factors influence behaviour and MNC–union
interaction.
Besides local factors, company interaction with trade unions is influ-
enced by structural factors such as the business cycle, production
planning, and (de)centralization of corporate employment policies. On
the side of the unions, the most important influence is local union strate-
gy, which can be part of a broader union policy at sectoral, national or
even transnational level. However, the unions active in the Electra facto-
ries are relatively independent and their strategies are firmly shaped by
particular local conditions. Works councils in these factories are second-
ary to the unions, and are therefore not discussed. The extent to which the
local factory management is independent from MNC headquarters, and
Kahancová: One Company, Four Factories
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the extent to which it is embedded in local conditions and values, influ-
ences the character of management–union coordination and the resulting
flexibility measures.
In management–union interaction we have to distinguish between
obligation to coordinate employment flexibility practices with unions,
which is prescribed by legal regulation, and management interest in trade
union involvement in negotiating employment flexibility. This is the
consequence of two sets of motives. The standard argument is that the
MNC fosters trade union involvement only for economic reasons:
union–management cooperation will develop when mutual economic
gains are expected and the costs of sharing management decision-making
with the unions do not exceed the expected benefits in terms of enhanced
performance (Katz et al., 1985). However, it is questionable whether
actors calculate costs and benefits of coordination extending beyond for-
mally institutionalized bargaining to daily informal interaction between
managers and factory union representatives. Every economic transaction
is formed through and by social interaction (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991;
Edelman, 2004): frequent interaction can lead to the emergence of trust,
shared values, power struggles, and discretion (Fox, 1974). Therefore, I
argue that the social motive to coordinate employment practices with
local unions supplements economic motives and legal obligation.
Moreover, this helps to understand why industrial relations and the role
of the unions differ across factories when law and economic calculations
are not plausible explanatory factors.
The capacity and interest of the MNC and the unions to invest in their
interaction indicate social embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985, 1992;
Krippner, et al., 2004). In other words, embeddedness refers to behaviour
that opts for coordination even if economically and legally the same
decision could have been taken unilaterally. Whereas in non-embedded
coordination based exclusively on rational economic considerations the
involved actors are not concerned with each others’ preferences, values,
and power relations, embeddedness incorporates favours to others with
The MNC 
Local  
management  
behaviour
Local 
union 
behaviour
Local employment 
Local Institutionsflexibility  practices
Corporate
structural factors 
Union 
structure and 
strategy
FIGURE 1. Analytical Framework 
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an expectation of future returns not specified in advance. As expected
economic benefits from coordination are unknown ex ante and favours
are left to the discretion of managers and unionists, trust among them is
essential. Trust, or confidence that the other party will not renege the
actions promised and benefits offered, is an informal institution that
lacks a specifically defined reciprocity and arises in social interaction
(Fox, 1974). Finally, power asymmetries between management and
unions may facilitate differences in coordination and thus employment
flexibility practices.
In sum, structural and institutional factors influence MNC behaviour
in local conditions. It is argued that the MNC is locally embedded if evi-
dence is found of informal institutions in the management–union social
interaction leading to trade union involvement in flexibility beyond legal
stipulations and economic motives.
Operationalization
The analysis examines employment flexibility practices and industrial
relations in four factories, compares them with local practice and with
other Electra factories, and examines the role of management–union inter-
action in shaping inter-plant variation. It proceeds in four steps.
First, it is essential to identify the source of variation in employment
flexibility practices, the focus being numerical flexibility (fluctuations in
worker headcount), external flexibility (the share of permanent, tempo-
rary and agency workers) and internal flexibility (the organization of
working time) (Atkinson, 1984; Gallie et al., 1998).
Second, the investigation focuses on corporate and local factors and
their effects on flexibility. Structural factors that influence the company’s
local embeddedness include its international experience and administra-
tive heritage, business cycle and production seasonality, cross-factory
coordination of production and HRM, management structure and cor-
porate policies on local industrial relations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002;
Edwards et al., 1999; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). In Electra the man-
agement of production workers is an operational issue without close
headquarters control; thus local embeddedness is likely if all factories
face similar structural constraints and are to a similar extent independent
of headquarters. Then the analysis focuses on the impact of host-country
labour law, system of industrial relations, labour market characteristics
and common flexibility practices. Information on host-country institu-
tions is based on secondary sources and opinions of managers, trade
union leaders and employers’ association representatives.
Third, I examine workplace management–union interaction and its
effects on employment flexibility, giving particular attention to informal
Kahancová: One Company, Four Factories
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institutions, shared values related to factory performance, trust and
informal agreements. These are evaluated according to subjective percep-
tions of managers and union representatives on cooperation, conflict,
power relations and trust. Even if a Polish trade union is much weaker
than one in Belgium, it may evaluate interaction positively, because the
benchmark is not the Belgian situation, but that in other Polish compa-
nies. Qualitative observations concentrate first on the regularity of
managers meeting the unionists to discuss issues of mutual interest.
Although they may not like each other, do they respect each other’s role
and does their coordination involve regular conversation, bargaining and
compromise? Second, what is the style of communication in terms of
(in)formality, threats and informal trade-offs, value-sharing, willingness
to compromise, and oral as against written communication?
Finally, I evaluate how far Electra involves trade unions in employment
flexibility issues and whether this stems from its legal obligations, economic
motives or social motives discussed above. The main guideline for identify-
ing embedded coordination is union involvement not explained by legal
obligation or particular economic benefits known to Electra beforehand.
The author conducted 114 interviews with HR and production
managers, workplace union representatives, regional and national repre-
sentatives and HR managers and union leaders at Electra headquarters.
The similarity of factories on the one hand, and the differing host-country
laws, industrial relations systems and common employment practices 
on the other allow control for corporate influences, and at the same time
clarify management behaviour and social interaction with local unions in
different institutional environments.
Employment Flexibility and Industrial Relations in Electra
Factories
Electra is the largest electronics producer in Europe. The challenges of
growing internationalization have led to several strategic reorganizations
involving a decreased focus on manufacturing and a gradual decline of
headcount to the current 164,000 employees worldwide. In contrast to a
traditionally centralized production planning, in HRM and industrial
relations the company remains decentralized.
The factories studied are comparable in products assembled, seasonal
shifts in production, and related to that a high degree of employment
flexibility. Geographical distance from Dutch headquarters does not
affect their position within the company. Information on employment
and industrial relations in the four factories is given in Table 1.
The Belgian factory (hereafter EBE) is a product development centre
and initial manufacturer before assembly is transferred to mass production
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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centres. Its special position requires even higher flexibility than the other
three plants. Despite a high proportion of engineers, production organiza-
tion and HRM for production workers are similar to other plants. Most
important agreements related to employment flexibility are concluded at
the workplace level. Building on the unions’ formal and historical power
and their workplace recognition, the factory’s industrial relations are inter-
active and mostly cooperative with agreed tradeoffs. Both unions and
management respect each other, communicate on a daily basis, conclude
many informal agreements and avoid open conflicts. Besides daily informal
interaction a monthly works council meeting formalizes EBE’s workplace
industrial relations.
The French factory (hereafter EFR) is a large-scale producer, among
the most important employers in a small industrial town with relatively
high unemployment. Employment flexibility is central and most agree-
ments are concluded at the workplace level. The existence of four unions
with ideological differences complicates management–union coordina-
tion. Industrial relations are less cooperative than in EBE and include
threats and militant action. Management–union interaction is limited to
formal monthly meetings, and informal agreements are rare.
The Hungarian factory (hereafter EHU) is a successful mass assembly
centre established in 1991. The rapid expansion of industrial parks over
the 1990s account for the region’s low unemployment; and EHU secures
enough workers by ‘importing’ them from great distances. EHU’s indus-
trial relations are exclusively workplace related. Because of relatively
high membership, the workplace trade union is more powerful than in
other locally established MNCs, in the majority of which a union does
not exist. Industrial relations have always been confrontational, involv-
ing conflicts and union-initiated court cases. However, management’s
interaction with the works council is cooperative. This leads to tensions
Kahancová: One Company, Four Factories
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TABLE 1a. Characteristics of the Four Factories: Employment
Factory Established High-season headcount Local
(production workers)a unemployment
EBE Belgium 1950s 1301 (401) Low 
(brownfield) (7.37%)
EFR France 1972 800 (600) Medium
(brownfield) (12%)
EHU Hungary 1991 2392 (2200) Low
(greenfield) (4%)
EPL Poland 1991 Ave. 984 (872) High
(greenfield) (27%)
a EBE and EPL (2003); EHU (2004); EFR (2005).
Source: Electra, local labor market authorities, Manpower France.
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between union and works council leaders although the works council’s
bargaining rights are limited.
The Polish factory (hereafter EPL) is a mass assembly site located in
a small industrial town where 90 percent of jobs are in foreign firms.
With its adjacent suppliers it is the second largest local employer. In a
decentralized industrial relations system, management and union
learned to interact with each other and developed a cooperative, exclu-
sively workplace-related, relationship. In contrast to Belgium, the union
does not have a formal power resource through a strong supporting sec-
toral organization, but its position is recognized and respected mainly
informally. Shared values on local employment and frequent interaction
prevent industrial conflicts.
In all four factories, production seasonality results in great numerical
flexibility for the production workforce (in contrast to administrative
and managerial staff). EFR, EHU and EPL show a similar fluctuation
pattern, because being mass production centres their seasonality is rela-
tively regular. EBE’s workforce fluctuations are even larger and less
regular than in the other sites.
The factories reveal great differences in their responses to the seasonal
workload, in terms of the balance between permanent and temporary
contracts or use of temporary agency workers. EBE has roughly equal
numbers of permanent workers, temporary workers (monthly contracts)
and temporary agency workers (weekly contracts). Exceptionally an
agency worker advances to a temporary Electra worker; however, the fac-
tory no longer hires permanent blue-collar workers. EFR has a stable pool
of permanent workers but does not hire its own temporary workers;
agency workers account for about 25 percent of headcount. EPL does not
normally hire agency workers, regarding direct recruitment as a positive
work incentive. About 60 percent of production workers are on tempo-
rary contracts, the rest are permanent. Because of high unemployment in
their region and the above-average working conditions, EFR and EPL do
not face difficulties in finding workers willing to work under flexible con-
ditions. Finally, EHU does not hire its own temporary workers. As in the
case of EFR, high demand for temporary labour initiated the development
of temporary labour agencies in the region, and 75 percent of EHU work-
ers are hired through these agencies. Although hiring permanent workers
is more constrained than before, agency workers do have chances of get-
ting a permanent contract. An interesting feature of EHU’s flexibility is
that nine percent of the workers come through an exchange with a nearby
ice-cream factory with opposite seasonality. Once admitted to the factory,
no discrimination between permanent, temporary and agency workers in
working time and pay was found in any of the factories.
The factories also show several differences in their internal flexibility
over working time. Although high-season weekly working hours equal
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to 40 in each factory, differences are observed in the number of shifts per
day, shift frameworks, and the compensation for overtime (see Table 2).
All factories prepare annual working-time calendars. In EBE and EPL,
these are negotiated with the unions; in EFR and EHU the unions are
simply informed. Changes in the calendar take immediate effect in EPL;
however, they are discussed with the union. In EBE and EFR, at least a
three-month shift framework must be maintained after prior negotiation
or consultation respectively. In EHU, an eight-week working time annu-
alization is possible according to the law and the factory’s collective
agreement. Working-time preferences of individual workers cannot be
extensively considered given the size of the workforce and the intrinsic
characteristics of shift work.
In EBE and EFR, weekly high-season working time exceeds that legal-
ly stipulated (36 and 35 hours, respectively), and extra hours are
compensated with more holidays. In EBE, this is by agreement with the
unions. EPL developed a unique working-time flexibility building on the
loose provisions of Polish labour law. To enable seasonal production and
avoid low season dismissals, EPL introduced min–max contracts, or
annualized working hours, with longer working in the high season and
shorter in the low season. Workers are minimally paid for half-time work
even if they stay at home because of reduced production. If production
increases, they are mobilized and work up to 40 weekly hours, receive
shift premia for non-standard hours, and overtime payments when
exceeding the 40-hour-week. In EHU, the standard working time is a
TABLE 2. Internal Flexibility
Shifts Weekly Working Shift Compensation
working hours, time frameworks for extra
high-season pattern hours
EBE 1–28 hrs 40 Full-time, 3 months 16 extra free
part-time days/year,
overtime pay,
shift premia
EFR 2–38 hrs 40 Full-time 3 months/ Min. 7 extra
12 weeks free days/
year, overtime
pay, shift
premia
EHU 3–48 hrs 40 Full-time 8 weeks Overtime pay,
shift premia
EPL 3–48 hrs 40 Min–max Annual, Overtime pay,
operational shift
changes premia
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three-shift regime or a continuous four-shift regime over seven days a
week, with a 48-hour break after working four days and before switch-
ing to another shift. Extra working days for workers with assigned free
days have to be announced three days in advance according to the facto-
ry’s collective agreement.
To sum up, the most striking difference is the factories’ external flexibil-
ity: EHU chooses to hire a large number of temporary agency workers,
EPL prefers to employ its own temporary workers, EBE hires both tem-
porary and agency workers, and EFR hires more agency workers than
EBE but less than EHU. Interestingly, EHU also exchanges workers with
a local factory with opposite seasonality. In internal flexibility, the largest
difference is that the seasonal working time modulation in EBE and EFR
surpasses legal regulations in the high season. Workers in all factories work
40 hours per week, which is common also in other companies in Poland
and Hungary, but exceeds the normal pattern in Belgium and France. The
next section evaluates the impact of corporate and local factors on these
flexibility measures.
Impact of Corporate Factors
Belonging to the same business unit means comparable corporate influ-
ences on each factory. These constrain production and business decisions,
and HRM for knowledge workers and managers, but not work practices
and industrial relations for production workers. Factories do report head-
count trends to headquarters, but except in EBE this has little influence on
whether to hire agency workers or their own temporary workers. This
duality between coordinated business management and decentralized
HRM means that factories do not need to negotiate their strategic posi-
tion within the company by engaging in local networks: they fully control
their employment practices. Consequently, employment flexibility is a
local matter despite its relevance for cross-factory competitiveness; it is
the company’s choice of benefiting from local conditions. Nevertheless,
how factories interact with local institutions is beyond corporate control,
and corporate factors do not explain the variation therein.
All factories have recently been exposed to reorganizations and changing
production volumes that increase flexibility needs. The relative import-
ance of EBE has increased, whereas EFR, EPL and EHU have maintained
their position. The factories’ previous role and union structure did not
influence the introduction of flexibility. Currently the factories are exposed
to similar business cycles and production seasonality; the high-demand
periods in the autumn and winter are counterbalanced by low seasons when
prodution falls. The emergence of flexibility in EBE and EFR relates to
decreased mass production and increased product variety, and in EPL and
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EHU mass production growth stimulated higher flexibility. Nevertheless,
reasons motivating flexibility did not lead to similar flexibility practices in
factories with increased mass production on the one hand, and increased
product variation on the other hand.
Another corporate factor, the management structure, affects flexibility
practices by fostering local responsiveness. All factories employ local HR
managers. A limited number of expatriates work in departments that
influence flexibility via production plan calculations; however, their goal
is to foster locally effective production solutions.
To summarize, corporate pressures are similar in all factories: decen-
tralized HRM of production workers, reorganizations, production
seasonality and local HR managers. As these similarities contrast with
the variation in flexibility measures, I argue that corporate structural
influences do not directly account for flexibility variation. Their indirect
influence is apparent through fostering HRM decentralization. Thus, the
analysis must now turn to the specificities of local conditions and the
company’s behaviour therein.
Impact of Local Institutions
First, host-country labour law is the basic benchmark for all factories. In
Belgium, the law strictly regulates employment flexibility options and
interaction with trade unions. Crucial provisions relate to part-time
work and an obligation to consult workplace unions over working time,
temporary agency workers and dismissals. The unions can veto the use of
temporary workers; management is also obliged to inform the unions
about operational issues. However, at EBE there is a voluntary coopera-
tive interaction which goes beyond simple information exchange; while
the unions do not obstruct recruitment of temporary workers. They are
also extensively involved in working-time decisions.
In France the law is less prescriptive than in Belgium, but stronger than
in Poland and Hungary. Electra is obliged to inform and consult the
unions on such issues as working time, calendar revisions, Saturday work
and use of agency workers, but not to negotiate. Union involvement in
EFR only marginally exceeds the legal requirements; and where it does
so, this has been achieved by unions’ militant action rather than volun-
tary management initiative.
Polish labour law sets the benchmark on working time, employment
contracts and dismissals, and the framework for union involvement at
EPL. Working-time issues are subject to consultation in unionized work-
places; but the law does not oblige the employer to conclude collective
agreements and grants significant freedom in flexibility measures. Despite
limited legal prescription, cooperative management–union coordination
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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developed in EPL is based more on informal cooperation than on struc-
tural and legal constraints.
Finally, EHU strictly follows the Hungarian labour law that obliges
the company to inform unions on most working time and employment
issues, but not to consult them. The union’s control over flexibility is
limited, both by the law and through informal EHU rules shaped by
workplace management–union relations. To compensate for its weak
position, the union closely monitors EHU’s legal compliance and has
filed many court cases. Although it has lost the majority of these, it main-
tains that unfair employment practices and dismissals occur at EHU.
Although legal regulation differs across countries, this cannot fully
explain the variation in flexibility practices. The laws in all countries
allow similar choices between agency and temporary workers, but the
factories choose different options. Nor does the legal regime explain
whether Electra merely conforms to the law or cooperates with unions
beyond the legal requirements.
Electra is responsive to host-country industrial relations systems and
does not attempt to impose its home-country structure of centralized
company bargaining. This occurs only in Belgium, but only in the form of
framework agreements; all flexibility-related issues are negotiated at plant
level. Both Electra and its unions prefer decentralized bargaining. The
unions maintain that their work is most effective at shop-floor level, in
close informal contact with their members – though especially in Belgium,
the union agenda is influenced by regional and national concerns.
A third potential influence on flexibility practices is the pattern
adopted by other local employers. But though approaches to numerical
flexibility are similar at Electra and other local firms with seasonal pro-
duction (electronics and food sectors), differences were observed in EBE,
EPL and EHU in terms of the use of temporary agency workers and the
length of their contracts. In EFR, practice resembles that in other local
firms. In internal flexibility, the main differences from local practices
include longer working hours in EBE and EFR compensated by extra
holidays, working time annualization via min–max contracts in EPL, and
a different shift regime in EHU from other local companies (see Table 3).
This indicates that employment practices in other local firms do not
determine the company’s approach.
Although Electra complies with labour law in all countries, it searches
for innovative flexibility measures by utilizing variations in legal regula-
tion, especially stipulations concerning workplace industrial relations.
Thus differences in laws and local practices create institutional spaces
within which management choice occurs. The finding that trade union
responses to the company’s flexibility attempts are similar increases the
explanatory relevance of management behaviour – especially its consis-
tency in exploiting local opportunity structures. Unions prefer increased
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employment security and do not favour temporary or agency workers,
fixed-term contracts and flexible working hours. But they also realize
that flexibility secures more jobs and is necessary for the factories to sur-
vive in international competition.
To conclude, neither corporate structure nor local institutions and
trade union responses alone account for the variation in the company’s
employment flexibility practices. Management evidently respects local
law and industrial relations norms, but its behaviour is not a straight-
forward adaptation; it benefits from local circumstances through its
coordination with workplace trade unions. The next section discusses
how workplace management–union interaction helps the development
of flexibility measures, and the extent to which this interaction is socially
embedded.
Management–Union Coordination and Embeddedness
Employment flexibility became central in EBE after the factory’s 1997
restructuring. The unions obviously did not welcome this trend, but
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TABLE 3. Variations from Local Employment Practices
External flexibility Internal flexibility
Electra Local practice Electra Local practice
EBE Agency Own workers 40-hour week, 36-hour week
workers (temporary extra holidays
(temporary part-time) 16 days/year
full-time)
EFR Agency Agency workers 40-hour week, 35-hour week
workers (seasonal extra holidays 
(seasonal full-time) 7 days/year
full-time)
EPL Own workers Own workers 40-hour week, 40-hour week,
(temporary (temporary min–max time full-time
min–max) short-term
full-time)
EHU Agency Agency workers 40-hour week, 40-hour week,
workers (temporary full-time full-time 
(temporary full-time) (3–4 shifts) (2–3 shifts)
full-time),
worker
exchange
between
employers
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simultaneously realized the growing pressures on the plant’s competi-
tiveness. Management can ultimately impose flexibility, but regularly
consults the unions: a reflection of both extensive legal requirements 
for union involvement and management–union social interaction.
Accordingly, it became less difficult for Electra to increase employment
flexibility, and the debates with the unions have moved from the princi-
ple of temporary agency workers to the headcount permitted. Electra
invested in an interactive relationship with unions even on issues where
it could legally – and consistently with its business strategy – have acted
unilaterally. This is obvious in negotiation over shift regimes, overtime
compensation, informal approvals of agency workers’ admission and the
length of contracts; management accepted a range of union proposals
concerning temporary night work, parking facilities, work conditions,
and changing rooms for agency workers. Management–union coordina-
tion incorporates prevalent trust to adhere to informal agreements;
managers and workplace union leaders can contact each other at any time
even on private mobile phones. Both parties appreciate this opportunity,
but know it should not be abused. To avoid recurring bargaining over
central issues, framework agreements are formalized and used in infor-
mal daily interaction. Overall, both Electra and unions are relatively
satisfied with their interactive coordination. The unions’ ideal is job secu-
rity, but they understand flexibility is central for maintaining the factory,
and thus jobs, in Belgium.
In EFR, management–union relations are noticeably conflictual, with
threats of strikes and overt union antagonism to the employer. In conse-
quence, management designs the majority of its flexibility practices
without union involvement. The level of management–union trust is low:
to avoid repudiation of agreements concluded, all are formalized at a
monthly works committee meeting. Otherwise management has little
formal or informal interaction with the unions, and their voice in shap-
ing flexibility only marginally exceeds the legal requirement. A typical
issue of extra-legal union involvement, and at the same time a point of
conflict, is planning the factory’s collective summer closure. In the past,
unions did not agree with the timing, organized a strike, and thus were
able to achieve a negotiating role. Electra now obtains union approval on
holiday dates. To sum up, as a consequence of ongoing conflicts, union
involvement in employment flexibility issues in EFR only marginally
exceeds the legally prescribed procedures. In cases where cooperation
goes beyond the law, union input has been acquired by militant action.
In both Hungary and Poland, the law prescribes only limited union
involvement in employment flexibility, and actual involvement in Electra
reflects the general character of management–union relations. Industrial
relations in EHU are well institutionalized, and a collective agreement
has been concluded since 1991; but relations have always been noticeably
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confrontational, with a lack of cooperation on operational issues. Such
confrontational industrial relations are not common in other local com-
panies. After a management change in 1997, regular informal discussions
and monthly meetings gradually ceased. Except for the annual bargain-
ing round, communication is limited to formal e-mails and occasional
talks. ‘Gentlemen’s agreements’ are limited although more likely than in
EFR; because of low trust, most agreements are documented in writing.
The union representative claims that Electra ignores the union and avoids
contacts; however, management and external union representatives blame
the workplace union leaders’ personal antagonism, unrealistic demands
and inability to cooperate. Electra claims the union is not democratic and
representative: despite the rulebook provisions for regular elections,
none have been held since 1991. EHU would prefer cooperative indus-
trial relations to frequent court cases. The parties have concluded a
formal agreement for at least three days’ notice of overtime working, and
for higher than obligatory shift bonuses. EHU would prefer working
time annualization, but the union has repeatedly refused. Thus, as at
EFR, the union influences employment flexibility practices not by coop-
eration but by confrontation with management. The union’s actual
involvement in regulating employment flexibility is thus limited and only
marginally exceeds the legal requirements. The hostile management–
union relationship is in strong contrast to the cooperation between
management and the works council. EHU management constantly
declares its willingness to cooperate with the union, but currently most
employment practices are unilaterally decided, sometimes after consulta-
tion with other local employers. The chances for embedded manage-
ment–union coordination are however higher than in EFR, because
management’s antagonism is directed to the current union leadership,
whereas in France it relates to the unions’ general ideological stance.
In EPL, management–union coordination evolved through mutual
learning, because neither the managers nor the union leaders had previ-
ous experience with workplace bargaining. After initial trials of strength
soon after the union was established in 1997, interaction has stabilized,
and the parties agreed on work regulations – the most important formal
document on EPL’s employment practices. Although coordination is
self-institutionalized and does not have a strong legal underpinning, fre-
quent interaction takes place and management involves the union in various
issues beyond the legal requirements, including revisions of the working-
time calendar and limitations on the number of consecutive nightshifts.
To cope with low production in 2003, the parties agreed a temporary
change of full-time to three-quarters time contracts, involving less pay but
avoiding dismissals. Both realize the drawbacks of flexibility, and to com-
pensate for negative effects on workers they agreed to improve working
conditions for temporary workers and to recruit them both according to
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performance appraisal and to social criteria (children, family income).
There was no obvious economic motivation for Electra to prefer these
alternatives; I argue this decision was based on shared values and enduring
positive experiences in social interaction with the union. The union claims
its involvement helps workers to cope with variable working hours and
wages. Management appreciates the union’s role, and the union appreciates
management’s willingness to respect informal agreements even if it occa-
sionally exercises its informally determined veto rights. Both parties claim
to have an open, trustful and cooperative relationship and mutual respect;
they adhere to joint agreements, most of which lack written formalization;
and they maintain that negotiations will continue until agreement is
reached without resort to extreme action. Nevertheless, the union struggles
unsuccessfully to increase employment security; its weakness is coupled
with workers’ fears of losing their jobs, which leads to an acceptance of
inconvenient working-time arrangements. To sum up, EPL management
favours positive coordination with the union, and treats union proposals as
a useful input and feedback for local HRM even if legal obligations or eco-
nomic motives are not obvious. This is similar to EBE, the difference being
that Polish unions are much weaker, and a well-functioning relationship is
primarily determined by management’s willingness to cooperate. Although
management attempts to contain union power within the existing frame-
work of workplace rules, both parties are satisfied, and their interaction is
more cooperative than in other local companies.
Findings and Discussion
Several findings emerge from the analysis of management–union coordina-
tion in each factory. First, given the company’s administrative heritage and
responsiveness to local conditions (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002), manage-
ments in all the factories studied have an interest in cooperation with local
unions, whether or not there are economic advantages or a legal require-
ment to do so. No evidence was found of breaches of legal obligations to
consult unions. Thus, management behaviour is embedded, seeking coor-
dination with local actors without knowing the benefits in advance.
Second, the company’s interest in coordination with local unions is a
means to benefit from local conditions in the process of developing
tailor-made flexibility practices. Both managements and unions in all the
factories are aware of the power asymmetry between the company and
unions; but management does not overtly exploit its power advantage in
any of the factories. Although the company’s intention to cooperate with
local unions is similar in each factory, the goal of embedded coordination
is not to implement the same employment practices everywhere. I argue
that the company’s aim is to develop locally optimal employment
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flexibility practices relative to the opportunities and constraints of the
labour market in each country.
Third, despite the company’s orientation to cooperate, union involve-
ment on flexibility issues differs across factories. Does this reflect
differences in legal regimes? If the degree of legally stipulated coordina-
tion between employers and employee representatives were central in
determining the extent of union involvement in workplace employment
practices, one would observe a regional pattern of coordination: there
would be more extensive coordination with local unions in western than
in central Europe because legal prescriptions are stronger. However,
empirical evidence does not reveal such a divide. Instead, differences in
the extent of union involvement in employment flexibility regulation
mirror the contrast between factories with cooperative industrial
relations, informal cooperation and a high level of trust, and those with
hostile industrial relations, conflicts, and low trust, and examples of each
pattern can be found in both regions (see Figure 2).
As for economic reasons to coordinate employment flexibility issues
with local unions, evidence from Electra shows that management–union
coordination is not limited to formal bargaining based on strategic
calculations. Instead, workplace industrial relations obtain their typical
spirit from the existence of informal interaction that rarely relates
directly to particular economic benefits and utility maximization. In
factories with cooperative industrial relations Electra involves unions
in flexibility design even without a clear prior indication of economi-
cally superior outcomes. According to information available at the
moment of union involvement, the company’s managers could have
taken the same decisions unilaterally. This finding supports the main
argument that variation in employment flexibility across the factories is
best explained by company and local union interests and their social
interaction.
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    Western Europe                                    Central Europe
 Low legally stipulated 
union involvement 
Cooperative industrial 
relations; union involvement in 
flexibility beyond the law
Hostile industrial relations; 
union involvement in flexibility 
within the law
High legally stipulated
 union involvement
EPL
EHUEFR
EBE
FIGURE 2. Non-Regional Divide in Management–Union Coordination
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Finally, even if cooperative management–union interaction enhances
union involvement in employment flexibility, it does not mean that
conflictful industrial relations hinder the company’s pursuit of high flex-
ibility. The consequence of union antagonism has been their exclusion
from decisions that are reached jointly in factories with more cooperative
industrial relations. This demonstrates that a detailed insight into work-
place industrial relations is necessary to understand the actual way in
which MNCs interact with host-country institutions and actors.
Summary and Implications
This article discusses why different employment flexibility practices exist
in Electra factories in Belgium, France, Hungary and Poland. Whereas all
factories show a similar pattern of numerical flexibility, they differ
remarkably in external and internal flexibility related to temporary work-
ers and working time. It is argued that corporate structural influences on
local flexibility and the mere existence of differing labour markets and
laws in the host countries cannot adequately explain the observed
variation. Instead, it is the interest and consequently behaviour of the
company to benefit from local conditions via social interaction with local
actors, particularly workplace trade unions, that explains the variation in
employment flexibility practices. The importance of trade unions derives
from legal regulation of their involvement in various employment flexi-
bility practices, their own power resources, and also the management
interest in coordination. Although trade unions in all factories desire
higher employment security, they play an important role in designing and
deploying flexibility measures through their coordination with manage-
ment. This is a concrete way for the company to benefit from various local
institutions in host countries and an alternative to hybridization of
employment practices based on unilateral rational decisions.
Management interest in cooperation with local unions has translated
into different kinds of management–union coordination across the fac-
tories studied. In those with cooperative industrial relations, shared
values and extensive trust, industrial relations resemble embedded coord-
ination. This means that management opts for union involvement even
without legal obligations or economic motivation to do so, and thus local
unions are more involved in designing employment flexibility practices.
In contrast, in factories with hostile industrial relations and limited infor-
mal interaction the company has developed its locally optimal employ-
ment flexibility practices without extensive union involvement.
This argument points to the active role of the company in maintain-
ing, or further enhancing, the existing variation in employment practices
and local industrial relations in Europe, contradicting the thesis of
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cross-national convergence. Second, it shows not only the company’s
responsiveness to local institutions, but also the conditions of its social
embeddedness, and the engagement of local unions in the firm’s deci-
sion-making. This challenges two arguments in the existing literature:
first, the utilitarian argument that MNCs will attempt to overcome local
differences and to disseminate best HRM practices across a variety of
host-country conditions (Marginson and Meardi, 2006); and second, the
image of the MNC as a homogenous and rational economic actor with
internally determined processes of decision-making (Grandori, 1987).
Through embedded social interaction, the rationality of the MNC is not
undermined, but enriched.
My arguments are based on empirical evidence from a single company,
which complicates generalizations on MNC behaviour and social inter-
action with local actors in different countries. What can be generalized is
that whether a company fosters union involvement or attempts unilater-
ally to design most suitable employment practices in different conditions
depends on a number of internal factors, as well as local institutions and
union behaviour. Given the power asymmetry between MNCs and local
unions, the most important among these factors is the company’s admin-
istrative heritage or internal corporate values that encourage decentralized
HRM and in particular responsiveness to local conditions via social
embeddedness.
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